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Plaintiffs, being the appellees and cross-appellants herein,
submit the following Reply Brief in support of their arguments
raised on cross-appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Reply

Brief

addresses

Plaintiffs on cross-appeal.
trial

court

erred

by

the

issues

raised

by

the

First, Plaintiffs contend that the

holding

that

under

Utah's

Occupying

Claimants Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 et seq., an individual
must show a belief in "ownership" to satisfy the statutory
element of "good faith." This issue is reviewed for correctness.
Plaintiffs assert that the correct reading of the statute does
not require a belief in ownership per se, but only a belief that
the party constructing improvements on real property believed
that he had a right to unlimited and exclusive use of the
improvements superior to that of any other claimant.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the Declaration of Trust by
which the UEP was established creates a private trust as a matter
of law.

This issue is reviewed for correctness.

Plaintiffs

contend that the Declaration states no charitable purpose and
provides for a definite and identifiable class of beneficiaries.
The UEP is thus a private trust on its face, and not a charitable
trust as adjudged by the district court.

1
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD IN
ADJUDICATING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS UNDER UTAH'S OCCUPYING
CLAIMANTS STATUTE.

The trial court held that in order to show "good faith"
under Utah's Occupying Claimants Statute, the Plaintiffs would be
required to prove a good faith belief that they owned the
property.

Plaintiffs contend herein that it was error to imply

a belief in "ownership" into the statutory definition of "good
faith," and dismissal of the claims under the Occupying Claimants
Statute should be reversed.
A.

The standard of review for this issue is "correctness."
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), this Court

made clear that questions of law are themselves reviewed for
correctness, without giving any deference to the trial judge's
determination

of

the

issue.

The

court

defined

"legal

determinations" as follows:
". . . those which are not of fact but are
essentially of rules or principles uniformly
applied to persons of similar qualities and
status in similar circumstances."
Plaintiffs' appeal under the Occupying Claimants' Statute is
based on a pure issue of law: whether a claimant, in order to
satisfy the statutory requirement of good faith, must prove a
good faith belief in "ownership" of the property.

The lower

court addressed this issue and held that although not expressly
stated in the statute, a requirement of a belief in "ownership"
should be implied in the law.

This legal determination of the

2
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district court is purely a question of what the law requires, and
is therefore reviewed for correctness, without any deference
being given to the decision of the district court. The issue is
not within the category of "application of law to fact" discussed
in Pena, which was discussed at length in the UEP's reply brief.1
*In its Reply Brief, the UEP cites Pena for the proposition
that review of the Court's judgment under a theory of unjust
enrichment involves application of law to fact, and the standard of
review is therefore within a spectrum running from correctness on
one hand to broad discretion on the other.
Plaintiffs do not
disagree with that general statement of the law, but submit that
review of the district court's judgment on Plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claim in this case requires that extremely broad
deference be given to the trial court for three reasons. First,
the issue is fact intensive. Although the UEP attempts to rely
exclusively on the written findings of the trial court, neither its
argument nor the written findings themselves are sufficient to
escape the fact that the issue arises from disputes which are
almost exclusively factual in nature.
The UEP should not be
permitted to circumvent effective review of these issue by refusing
to order the transcript and then attempting to spin doctor the
written findings into something that the trial court, by virtue of
its own ruling, obviously did not intend.
Second, application of the factors discussed in Pena itself
dictates that broad discretion be given the district court in this
case. Pena set out the following three factors for guaging the
degree of discretion afforded to the trial court in applying law to
fact: (1) whether the complexity and varying nature of facts to
which the law must be applied would prevent an adequate rule from
being formulated; (2) whether the circumstances are sufficiently
new to the court that appellate judges cannot effectively identify
what factors are outcome determinative; and (3) whether the trial
court has observed "facts," such as a witness's appearance and
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
adequately be reflected in the record available to the appellate
Courts. Without further discussion here, Plaintiffs submit that
these factors, particularly the first and third factors, weigh
heavily in favor of broad deference to the trial court. Where the
appellate court does not even have the factual record to review,
the need for such discretion is even more apparent.
Finally, broad discretion is consistent with both pre- and
post-Pena case law addressing similar issues. Equity cases decided
before Pena universally hold that review of equity cases shall be
made on the facts and the law, and will not be reversed except to
prevent manifest injustice. See Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338
3
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B.

The trial court erred by expanding the statutory requirement
of "good faith" to include a belief in "ownership."
The UEP contends that 80 years of case law support the

proposition that belief in "ownership" is an element of a claim
under the Occupying Claimants Statute*

That assertion ignores

the fact that no prior case involves a fact pattern such as the
one presented here in which claimants had a good faith belief
that they held an unlimited and exclusive right to occupy and use
the improvements and the property, but understood that legal
"title" was vested in the name of another.

In short, there

simply is not a prior case which examines whether belief in
"ownership" is an element of the "good faith" required by the
statute.
Beyond the discussion of prior cases, the UEP's reply brief
offers no cogent reason why a belief in "ownership" carries out

(Utah 1980); Penrose v. Penrose. 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); Parks
Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982) . These
cases are not inconsistent with Pena and its pasture analogy. As
pasture's go, they merely stand for the proposition that the trial
court's pasture of discretion in equity cases is extremely large,
and will only be fenced off where necessary to prevent "manifest
injustice." Cases since Pena have suggested that discretion is
broad on similar issues. See State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781
(Utah App. 1996) (holding that the question of whether a waiver of
the right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily is highly fact dependent and thus the trial court is
afforded discretion); Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern,
928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (suggesting that even if the issue of whether a
contract was modified was viewed as a question of law, the inquiry
would be fact-dependent, and therefore "a great deal of discretion"
would be afforded to the trial court); State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d
446 (Utah 1996) (noting that the legal standard for "reasonable
suspicion" is highly fact dependent, and therefore recognizing a
measure of discretion for the district court).
4
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the statutory purpose better than merely a good faith belief that
one has

the right

to unlimited

and exclusive use

improvements superior to that of any other party.

of the

Plaintiffs

submit that the statute is intended to do justice to those who
improve property expressly for their own benefit, only to learn
that another holds a superior claim to the fruits of their labor.
Implying a technical "ownership" requirement into the element of
good faith detracts from this statutory purpose by raising form
over substance.

It treats parties with essentially the same

problem--the risk of losing valuable improvements that they built
for their own use--differently based on a technicality of legal
"title."
Plaintiffs submit that the statutory definition of "color of
title" indicates a legislative intention that technical issues of
"title" not control the inquiry.

Specifically, the statute

defines one as having color of title "if he, or those under whom
he claims, have at any time during such occupancy with the
knowledge or consent, express or implied, of the real owner made
any valuable improvements thereon."
Where

the statute

itself

Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4.

contemplates that

construction of

improvements with consent of the real owner constitutes "color of
title, " it is not reasonable to imply a requirement that the
claimant believe himself to be the "real owner" to satisfy the
statute.
Plaintiffs submit that for these reasons and for those
reasons set forth in the principal brief, the better rule of law
5
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is that the good faith belief required under the statute is
merely the belief that one has an unlimited and exclusive right
to the property superior to that of any other claimant.

That

interpretation is consistent with the language of Hidden Meadows
Development Co. v. Mills. 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) , cited by the
UEP in its reply brief, and consistent with the intent of the
legislature expressed in the statute.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT THE
UNITED EFFORT PLAN WAS A PRIVATE TRUST ON ITS FACE.2

In its Reply Brief, the UEP argues that the trust is a
charitable trust because it serves a charitable purpose and does
not have definite beneficiaries. Plaintiffs contend that neither
conclusion is supported by the four corners of the Declaration of
Trust, and the lower courts' determination should be reversed.
A.

The Declaration of Trust identifies no charitable purpose.
In its reply brief, the UEP accurately concludes that one

characteristic of a charitable trust is that it designates and
serves a charitable purpose. Plaintiffs agree, but contend that
no charitable purpose is designated in the Declaration of Trust.
While Article VIII provides that " [t]he purpose and object of the
trust shall first be charitable and philanthropic" (R. 1840) , the
document never defines any charitable and philanthropic purpose
interpretation of a contract is purely a question of law, 5J3
West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake, 784
P.2d 104 (Utah 1989) . Therefore, this issue is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). See also
Matter of Estate of Groesbeck. 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1997) (holding
that the validity of a trust is a question of law reviewed for
correctness).
6
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at all. Instead, it merely indicates that the trust will engage
in "all kinds of legitimate business ventures" (Article VIII, R.
1840) , and will distribute its earnings to the "members" as
deemed appropriate by the trustees.

(Article XII, R. 1842).

In

short, the Declaration of Trust describes the operation of the
trust in a manner wholly divorced from any charitable purpose,
such as those described in the authorities cited by the UEP.
(See Reply Brief of Appellants, at 23) .
The UEP's Reply Brief attempts to escape this reality by
arguing that the
purpose.

"advancement of religion" is a charitable

(See Reply Brief of Appellants, at 23) .

have no quarrel with that statement of the law.

Plaintiffs

However, the

Declaration of Trust makes no mention of any religious purpose.
In

fact,

the

document

does

not

use

the

"religion," "God," or even "Priesthood Work."
in ' terms of cestui que trustents
equitable

and

beneficial

words

"church, "

Instead, it talks

(preamble, Article XVIII),

interests

(preamble),

profits

(preamble) , business ventures (Article VIII), trust membership
(Article XII), membership certificates (Article XII), dividends
(Article XII), and distributions

(Article XVII).

A stated

purpose to advance religion simply is not stated within the four
corners of the Declaration of Trust.
It was error for the lower court to go beyond the plain
language of the Declaration and find a charitable purpose where
none can be drawn from the face of the document. The Declaration
of Trust merely provides for a system by which a group of
7
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individuals can engage collectively in carrying on businesses,
the profits of which will be used to service the needs of the
group.

This

arrangement

is

consistent

with

a

private

cooperative; it is not consistent with any recognized definition
of charity.
B.

The Declaration of Trust establishes an identifiable and
definite group of beneficiaries.
The UEP agrees that in order to be a charitable trust, the

UEP must have indefinite and unidentified beneficiaries.

It

argues that "[n]o person was specifically designated in the
declaration as

either a beneficiary

or a member

. . . ."

Plaintiffs disagree.
First, there can be no doubt that at the moment the
Declaration of Trust was first executed, its beneficiaries were
John Y. Barlow, Joseph W. Musser, LeRoy S. Johnson, J. Marion
Hammon, and Rulon T. Jeffs--the original subscribers who signed
the trust document.

That proposition is clear from the very

preamble of the Declaration which reads in part as follows:
Further, it is understood and agreed that we and
such other members as may hereafter come into
said association are associated together merely
and solely for purpose of being cesti (sic) que
trustents of the trust hereby created, thus being
entitled
to the equitable and beneficial
interests of all profits and property, both
personal, real and mixed, of the trust estate
hereby
created,
in accordance with their
respective just wants and needs as determined
from time to time by the Board of Trustees and as
the trust estate may be able to respond thereto.
(R. 1837).

8
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In short, when the declaration was signed, it had five cesti
que trustents, or beneficiaries.3
and

identified

because

Those five men were definite

their names

appeared

on

the

trust

document. Plaintiffs submit that because the trust at its outset
had five identified beneficiaries who were "entitled to the
equitable and beneficial interests of all profits and property .
. . of the trust estate," it was indisputably a private trust at
the moment of its creation.

Plaintiffs are not aware of any

provision of law or the trust document that would allow the UEP
to argue that a metamorphosis has occurred since creation of the
trust

sufficient

to

convert

the UEP

from a private

to a

charitable trust.
Second, on the face of the Declaration of Trust, the term
"members" clearly refers to beneficiaries or cestui que trustents
of the trust. The first mention of "members" in the Declaration
is in the language from the Preamble cited above.

Therein, the

term members is expressly equated with "cesti que trustents," or
beneficiaries.

Further definition of the term is offered in

Article XII as follows:

Slack's Law Dictionary, defines "cestui que trustent" as
follows:
He who has a right to a beneficial interest in and
out of an estate the legal title to which is vested
in another. The person who possesses the equitable
right to property and receives the rents, issues,
and profits thereof; the legal estate of which is
vested in a trustee. The beneficiary of a trust.
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 229.
9
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Evidence of membership shall be shown in the
books of the association.
A membership
certificate may, in the discretion of the
trustees, be issued to each member; but such
certificate shall not be transferable, nor carry
title to any of the property or assets of the
trust.
* * *

Further and additional membership shall be
established and added to by the consecration of
such property, real, personal or mixed, to the
trust in such amounts as shall be deemed
sufficient by the Board of Trustees . . .
(R. 1842-43).

Finally, the Declaration provides that upon

termination, the members of record shall share and share alike in
a distribution of trust property.

(Article XVII, R. 1845).

Plaintiffs contend that the members are the beneficiaries.
The stated intent of the trust was that individuals become
members by contributing to the trust, and that such members would
be recorded in the books and issued certificates.4

The UEP has

admitted and the trial court found that these procedures have
been ignored in substantial measure. The trustees' utter failure
to follow the trust document, however, cannot change the trust
from a private to a charitable trust.

On its face, the trust

contemplates a discreet, identifiable list of members. These are
the beneficiaries.5
4

At trial, there was evidence that certificates were actually
issued in the early years of the trust, but this practice faded out
prior to any of the Plaintiffs becoming involved with the UEP.
5

Both the UEP and the trial court find significance in the
provision of the Declaration of Trust allowing the trustees to give
"needed assistance" to non-members of the trust in their
discretion.
(See R. 1745) . Plaintiffs are aware of no legal
10
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The trial

court

recognized

that the UEP was

to have

identifiable members, but concluded that being a member did not
make one a beneficiary.

Neither the UEP nor the trial court has

offered any satisfactory explanation of what the "members" are if
they are not beneficiaries. Plaintiffs urge this Court to reject
any notion that the term "members" refers to anything other than
the beneficiaries

of

the trust, consistent with

definition of the trust relationship.

the legal

Where the Declaration of

Trust establishes that "members" shall contribute to the trust
and benefit therefrom, the trust is a private trust, not a church
or a charity. .

'

In sum, the UEP was not drafted to be a charitable trust.
Its purposes were to provide for the maintenance of a discreet
group of members who would come into the trust by contributing
sufficient property.
in

light

of

the

In the absence of a charitable purpose and
its

identifiable

and

definite

class

of

member/beneficiaries, the UEP should be denominated a private
trust as a matter of law. This matter should thus be remanded to
the district court so that Plaintiff's claims for accounting,
breach of fiduciary duty, and distribution may be adjudicated in
the context of a private trust.

reason why authorization to distribute property beyond the defined
class of beneficiaries would change the nature of the trust from
private to charitable. In fact, it merely acknowledges that there
is in fact a defined class of members who are the principal objects
of the trust's beneficence.
11
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs urge this Court to
reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claims under
Utah's occupying claimants statute and reverse the trial court's
holding that the UEP is a charitable trust. The matter should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings relevant to
these issues only.
DATED this <-y[^ day of September, 1997.
WOODBURY & KESLERf P.C.

'y.Jix

jLt~

Reld W. Lambert/
U
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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